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Abstract— We formulate a Stackelberg game between an
attacker and a defender of a power system. The attacker
attempts to alter the load setpoints of the power system covertly
and intelligently, so that the voltage stability margin of the grid
is reduced, driving the entire system towards a voltage collapse.
The defender, or the system operator, aims to compensate
for this reduction by retuning the reactive power injection to
the grid by switching on control devices, such as a bank of
shunt capacitors. A modified Backward Induction method is
proposed to find a cost-based Stackelberg equilibrium (CBSE)
of the game, which saves the players’ costs while providing the
optimal allocation of both players’ investment resources under
budget and covertness constraints. We analyze the proposed
game extensively for the IEEE 9-bus power system model and
present an example of its performance for the IEEE 39-bus
power system model. It is demonstrated that the defender is
able to maintain system stability unless its security budget is
much lower than the attacker’s budget.
Index Terms— Stackelberg game, voltage stability, load at-
tacks, security investment, power systems
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, significant research has been done
on cyber-security of power systems [1] with applications in
state estimation [2], volt/VAr control [3], automatic gener-
ation control [4], etc. In this paper we address an equally
important and yet less-visited cyber-attack scenario in power
systems - namely, covert attacks on loads causing degrada-
tion of voltage stability. Unlike other papers, such as [5], that
report detection and control problems for load attacks, our
goal is to formulate an investment strategy that power system
operators can adopt to secure the grid when an attacker tries
to drive it to voltage collapse by manipulating a chosen set
of load setpoints. This manipulation can be done in a covert
way for each individual load, so that the user does not feel
any difference in consumption, but when hundreds of such
loads are tweaked simultaneously, the cumulative effect can
still result in severe degradation of voltage stability [6].
We use a Stackelberg game (SG) [7] to formulate this
security investment, considering the defender as the leader
and the attacker as the follower [8]. Game theory has been
a common tool for analyzing security problems in cyber-
physical systems [8], [9]. Cooperative and non-cooperative
games have also been proposed for non-attack scenarios such
as load balancing and voltage stability in [10], [11]. To the
best of our knowledge, no research has been done to explore
how game theory pertains to security investment for load
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attacks. Moreover, most game-theoretic security investment
research employs dynamic games [8], including stochastic
games and games that utilize learning. In these games,
the players repeatedly update their investment strategies in
response to the opponents’ actions. However, these games
are not practical when long-term, fixed security investment
is desired.
The SG for our problem is set up as follows. The attacker
plans to hack covertly into a set of loads and modify
their setpoints to increase the system-wide voltage instability
index [6]. The defender switches on control devices to com-
pensate the reactive power balance in the grid proactively,
so that the instability index remains close to its safe value
if an attack occurs in the future. Both players are subject
to budget constraints. Additionally, the attacker aims to
remain covert. We modify the standard backward induction
[7] for SG to choose a Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) [12]
that reduces the players’ costs while retaining their payoffs.
The resulting cost-based Stackelberg equilibrium (CBSE)
provides guidelines to the system operator for fixed, long-
term grid protection against voltage stability attacks. We
validate our results using the IEEE 9-bus and 39-bus power
system models and demonstrate that voltage stability can be
maintained unless the defender’s security resources are much
more limited than the attacker’s budget.
II. POWER SYSTEM MODEL
We first recall the definition of voltage instability index
from [6], which will be used as the central metric for
evaluation of our game. Consider a power system with
M ≥ 1 generators, and K ≥ 1 loads, where the load buses
are indexed as the first K buses, followed by M generator
buses. Let the steady-state voltage magnitudes at the load
buses be stacked as VL = [V1, · · · , VK ] ∈ RK , and at the
generator buses as VG = [VK+1, · · · , VK+M ] ∈ RM . Let
the admittance matrix of the network be denoted as Y =
G + jB, where B is referred to as the susceptance matrix.
We partition the susceptance matrix B ∈ R(K+M)×(K+M)
into four block matrices as:
B =
(
BLL BLG
BGL BGG
)
, (1)
where BLL contains the interconnections among loads, and
BLG = BGL
T represents the interconnections between loads
and generators. Following the derivations in [6], one can then
define the open-circuit load voltage vector as:
V∗L = −B−1LLBLGVG, (2)
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and, subsequently, the symmetric stiffness matrix as:
Qcirt ,
1
4
diag(V∗L) ·BLL · diag(V∗L), (3)
where diag(·) denotes the diagonal matrix.
Using (2) and (3), the voltage instability index of the
system can be defined as:
∆ = ||Q−1cirtQL||∞, (4)
where QL = [Q1, · · · , QK ] ∈ RK is a K-dimensional real
vector that represents the reactive power setpoints at the load
buses. Here, || · ||∞ refers to the `∞-norm, which picks the
absolute value of the element with the largest magnitude in a
vector. The kth entry of the matrix-vector product Q−1cirtQL
captures the stability stress on load k, with || · ||∞ identifying
the maximally stressed node. According to Theorem 1 in [6],
the power flow equation will have a unique, stable solution if
∆ < 1. Equivalently, ∆ ≥ 1 indicates that at least one load
bus in the system is overly stressed and can be responsible for
a voltage collapse. We refer to 1−∆ as the voltage stability
margin [13]. The larger the value of ∆, the narrower the
stability margin is and the closer the power system is to a
voltage collapse. Denote the nominal voltage stability index
∆0 as the value of ∆ computed from (4) using the nominal
reactive power setpoints Q0L (over a certain period of time
assuming that the setpoints are constant over this period).
According to Proposition 3 in supplementary note 6 of [6],
Q−1cirt has negative elements and QL has positive elements.
Thus, if some elements of QL increase, the `∞-norm in
(4) also increases. Therefore, the voltage instability index
∆ in (4) increases as the reactive power demands of the
loads grow. An attacker can increase the reactive power
demands at appropriately chosen load buses by adding an
incremental vector qa = [q1a, · · · , qKa ] ∈ RK to Q0L and
thus easily narrow down the voltage stability margin. Since
only the reactive power setpoints are tampered with, and
not the active power setpoints, the user may not feel any
difference in her consumption pattern, which makes this type
of attack unobservable to a large extent. The attacker can
further make this attack covert by designing the entries of qa
small enough that they maintain the load bus voltages to be
within their usual allowable range of 0.9 per unit (pu) to 1.1
pu while still pushing ∆ towards 1. To prepare for possible
future attacks, the operator, or the defender, can switch
on voltage control devices, such as shunt capacitors and
power electronic converters, to compensate for the potential
increase in consumption in advance. These control devices
may or may not be located at the load bus. If they are
not, their equivalent contribution of reactive power at the
K load buses can be obtained by simple network reduction.
Let this equivalent K-dimensional reactive power compen-
sation vector be denoted as qd = [q1d, · · · , qKd ] ∈ RK .
When an attack happens, the overall reactive power balance
becomes Q
′
L = Q
0
L + qa − qd. The goal of the defender
is to compensate for the attacker’s actions and to avoid the
voltage collapse by maintaining the post-attack ∆ as close
as possible to the nominal ∆0. We assume that the players
have full knowledge of the system model and each other’s
parameters. Thus, this investigation characterizes ideal game
performance. We plan to extend it to uncertain scenarios in
future work.
III. THE COST-BASED STACKELBERG GAME
In the proposed Stackelberg game (SG), the actions of the
attacker, a ∈ RK , and the defender, d ∈ RK , correspond
to a finite number of discrete investment levels into the K
loads and K control devices, respectively. A higher value
of each element ak (or dk) indicates a greater chance of
successful attack (or protection) for the kth load. Given
an investment pair (a, d), the utilities, or payoffs, of the
attacker and the defender are termed Ua(a,d) and Ud(a,d),
respectively, expressed in terms of the instability index ∆.
The attacker aims to maximize ∆ (thus degrading the system
performance) while the defender aims to reduce it. In this
zero-sum game [7], Ud(a,d) = −Ua(a,d). The defender
is the leader, who establishes its investment profile d first.
The attacker follows by choosing its action a = g(d) =
arg max
a
Ua(a,d), a best response to d, which maximizes
the attacker’s utility given the defender’s strategy d. On
the other hand, the defender chooses a strategy d∗ that
maximizes its utility given the attacker’s best responses g(d)
to all its actions. A resulting Stackelberg equilibrium (SE)
[7] (a∗, d∗), where a∗ = g(d∗), optimizes the utility of each
player in an SG. Finally, we modify the standard Backward
Induction (BI) method [7] for computing an SE and develop a
cost-based Stackelberg game (CBSG) that saves the players’
costs without compromising their payoffs.
A. Players’ Actions and Cost Constraints
The attacker’s actions are denoted as a =
[a1, · · · , ak, · · · , aK ] ∈ RK , where ak ∈ {0, 1/(La − 1),
2/(La − 1), · · · , 1} is a discrete level of investment
into load k, and La denotes the number of attacker’s
investment levels. We assume each load is equipped
with protective software. The value of ak denotes the
probability of successfully hacking into load k, which is
determined by attacker’s investment level, or the amount
of resources allocated to hacking this load. Thus, for any
attack action a, there are 2K possible outcomes. Define
the ith outcome of attack at all loads by a binary K-tuple
Oi = [oi1, · · · , oik, · · · , oiK ],∀i = 1, · · · , 2K , where oik = 1
if attack at node k is successful and oik = 0 if it fails. Given
an attacker’s action vector a, the probability of outcome Oi
is given by:
Pa(O
i) =
∏
k:∀oik=1
ak
∏
k:∀oik=0
(1− ak). (5)
In addition, we assume that if the attacker successfully
hacks into load k, the nominal reactive power demand Qk
of this load will be increased by qka , where Qk is the k
th
element of QL in (4). The combined incremental demand
for outcome Oi is represented by a 1×K vector given by:
qia = O
i  qa, (6)
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where qa = [q1a, · · · , qka , · · · , qKa ] and  indicates element-
wise multiplication.
Next, we define the defender’s actions as d =
[d1, · · · , dk, · · · , dK ] ∈ RK , where dk ∈ {0, 1/(Ld −
1), 2/(Ld − 1), · · · , 1} denotes the defender’s investment
level on load k, or equivalently, the control device of that
load, and Ld is the number of defender’s investment levels.
Let us assume the maximum reactive power that the defender
is able to compensate on load k is qk,maxd when the level
dk = 1, where q
k,max
d is selected so that the voltage at
that load bus does not exceed 1.1 pu. For the level dk,
the defender’s compensation is qkd = dkq
k,max
d . The reactive
power demand compensation for all loads is specified by the
1×K vector:
qd = [q
1
d, · · · , qkd , · · · , qKd ]. (7)
Finally, we assume both players’ investments are subject to
the following constraints. The attacker’s constraints include:
1) Cost constraint: Assume attack on load k at full effort
(i.e., when ak = 1) has cost γa ∈ R. Scaling this cost
by the level of effort ak and summing over all loads,
we obtain the following constraint on the total cost of
the attacker:
γa||a||1 ≤ 1, (8)
where || · ||1 denotes the `1-norm, which is given by the
sum of the magnitudes of all elements of the vector.
2) Covertness constraint: Considering that the voltage at
every load bus is mandated to be within an operating
range of 0.9 to 1.1 pu, the attacker must be covert in the
sense that it cannot change the demand at any target bus
k beyond a limit qk,maxa as that may violate this voltage
range, leading to the attack being caught by the operator.
This covertness constraint is, therefore, modeled as:
qka ≤ qk,maxa ,∀k. (9)
Note that qk,maxa will be different for different k due to
physical variabilities of the loads.
The defender has the following constraint:
Cost of protection: Assuming full protection (i.e. dk =
1) for load k costs γd ∈ R, the defender’s budget
constraint is given by:
γd||d||1 ≤ 1. (10)
Remark 1. In (8) and (10), we assumed without loss of
generality that the total cost of each player is bounded by 1.
Thus, the scalars γa and γd represent scaled costs per load
of the attacker and defender, respectively.
B. Players’ Utility Functions
Prior to the attack, the instability index ∆ = ∆0. The
attacker aims to increase ∆, but not exceed ∆ = 1 since the
latter results in system voltage collapse and any additional
investment wastes the attacker’s resources. Moreover, to save
its cost, the defender invests only to compensate for the
attacker’s action, i.e. it aims to reduce ∆ while maintaining
∆ ≥ ∆0. Thus, the utilities of the players are defined in
terms of the deviation ∆−∆0.
Given the attacker’s and defender’s actions a and d,
respectively, the reactive power demand vector for the ith
outcome Oi is computed as Qi
′
L = Q
0
L + q
i
a − qd. The
attacker’s utility for the ith outcome Oi is given by:
Uai (d) = Clip
(∥∥∥Q−1cirtQi′L∥∥∥∞; (∆0, 1))−∆0, (11)
where
Clip(x; (∆0, 1)) =
 ∆
0 x ≤ ∆0
x ∆0 < x < 1
1 x ≥ 1
. (12)
Given the strategy pair (a,d) under the attacker’s con-
straints (8) and (9), the attacker’s utility is represented as
the expectation of (11) over all outcomes:
Ua(a,d) = E (Uai (d)) =
2K∑
i
Pa(O
i)Uai (d), (13)
s.t. γa||a||1 ≤ 1, qka ≤ qk,maxa ,∀k.
In the proposed zero-sum game, the defender’s utility under
the constraint (10) is given by:
Ud(a,d) = −Ua(a,d), (14)
s.t. γd||d||1 ≤ 1.
Finally, we make the following realistic assumptions: (i)
the attacker is able to cause voltage collapse when it has
unlimited resources and the defender is inactive, and (ii) the
defender is able to compensate fully for the attacks when
both players have unlimited budgets.
C. Cost-based Stackelberg Equilibrium (CBSE)
An SE is usually found using the Backward Induction (BI)
algorithm [7]. Since multiple SEs are possible in an SG, we
modify the BI method to select an SE that saves both players’
costs. The Cost-based Backward Induction (CBBI) algorithm
is described below:
Step 1: (a) For each defender’s action d that satisfies (10),
the attacker determines the set of its best responses G(d),
where g(d) ∈ G(d) if
g(d) = arg max
a
Ua(a,d), (15)
s.t. γa||a||1 ≤ 1, qka ≤ qk,maxa ,∀k,
(b) For any d, if there are multiple attacker’s best re-
sponses in G(d), the attacker chooses a response with the
smallest cost:
go(d) = arg min
g(d)∈G(d)
||g(d)||1. (16)
Step 2: (a) The defender determines the set of investment
strategies D that maximize its payoff where d∗ ∈ D if:
d∗ = arg max
d
Ud(go(d),d), (17)
s.t. γd||d||1 ≤ 1.
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(b) If multiple solutions exist in D, a strategy with the
smallest cost is chosen:
d∗o = arg min
d∗∈D
||d∗||1. (18)
Denote
a∗o = go(d
∗
o). (19)
The strategy pair (a∗o,d
∗
o) in (18) and (19) is a cost-based
Stackelberg equilibrium (CBSE), and the corresponding game
is termed the cost-based Stackelberg game (CBSG). The
following Theorem summarizes several properties of SGs
and of the proposed CBSG.
Theorem 1.
(a) An SE exists in a finite two-player SG.
(b) All SEs of a zero-sum SG have the same payoffs.
(c) In a CBSG, given La and Ld, the utility of each player
is non-increasing with its cost per load when the opponent’s
cost per load is fixed.
(d) Given La and Ld, there exist  > 0 and θ > 0 such
that when γa <  while γd > θ, the attacker’s utility at
CBSE Ua(a∗o,d
∗
o) = 1 − ∆0 (i.e. voltage collapse occurs).
Moreover, there exists an α > 0 such that when γd < α, the
attacker’s utility at CBSE Ua(a∗o,d
∗
o) = 0 (i.e. ∆ = ∆
0).
(e) When Ld (or La) is increased to a number of investment
levels L
′
d (or L
′
a) that satisfies L
′
d − 1 = n(Ld − 1) (or
L
′
a − 1 = n(La − 1)), where n is a positive integer, the
defender’s (or attacker’s) utility does not decrease if the costs
and the opponent’s number of investment levels La (or Ld)
are fixed.
Proof. Please refer to [14], [15, Appx.A].
From Theorem 1, CBBI selects an SE with reduced costs
of both players while providing the payoff of any other SE.
Remark 2. Instead of defining a zero-sum game with hard
cost constraints, a general-sum SG, where the costs and
covertness are incorporated into in the utility functions [16],
can be investigated. Note that Theorem 1(b) does not hold for
this non-zero sum game. We expect the performance trends
of this game to resemble those of the proposed zero-sum SG.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
A. Game Analysis for the IEEE 9-bus System
The IEEE 9-bus system has 6 load buses, which are
potential targets for the players in the proposed SG. The
nominal voltage instability index for this system is computed
as ∆0 = 0.1935. In the simulation, qk,maxa is determined by
the covertness constraint (9), and we set qk,maxd = 2 pu, ∀k.
It was verified that these compensations do not violate the
[0.9, 1.1] pu voltage range for any bus.
First, we examine the dependency of the proposed CBSG
on the players’ costs. Fig. 1 shows the attacker’s utility
Ua(a∗o,d
∗
o) (13) at CBSE while Fig. 2 and 3 illustrate
the players’ strategies for varying scaled costs of attack
γa and protection γd assuming three investment levels for
each player. We observe the performance trends described
in Theorem 1 (a)∼(d). In Fig. 1, the largest attacker’s utility
is 1 −∆0 = 0.8065 (voltage collapse), which occurs when
γa ≤ 0.15 and γd ≥ 0.75. In this case, the defender’s cost per
load greatly exceeds that of the attacker’s, so the attacker is
able to increase its reactive power demand to achieve ∆ = 1
while the defender cannot compensate due to its limited
resources. On the other hand, when the defender’s cost is
small (γd ≤ 0.15), implying the defender has sufficient
resources to compensate for any level of attack, the resulting
Ud(a∗o,d
∗
o) = −Ua(a∗o,d∗o) = 0 or ∆ = ∆0. Finally, we
found that as γd → ∞ (not shown), the defender becomes
inactive. In this case, voltage collapse happens if γa ≤ 0.3
while ∆ = ∆0 is achieved only if the attacker is also
inactive (γa > 2). By comparing these results with Fig.
1, we conclude that strategic protection is necessary for
maintaining a reliable instability index ∆.
Multiple SEs
exist
Voltage Collapse
∆ൌ ∆଴
Fig. 1: Attacker’s utility at CBSE vs. γa and γd for La =
Ld = 3
TABLE I: “Importance” ranking of loads for the attacker and
defender for the IEEE 9-bus system
Load # Attacker Defender
∆−∆0 Ranking ∆0 −∆ Ranking
4 0.2947 4 0.0892 4
5 0.2825 6 0.2379 1
6 0.3040 1 0.2101 2
7 0.2871 5 0.0584 5
8 0.2987 3 0.1364 3
9 0.3025 2 0.0257 6
Next, to illustrate the players’ strategy choices, we list the
“importance” ranking of loads for both players in Table I.
First, we show the increment of the instability index ∆ −
∆0 (assuming the initial value ∆0) when the reactive power
demands of individual loads are increased by the maximum
allowed covertness limit qk,maxa . The greater the increment
for an individual load, the more “important” that load is to
the attacker. In addition, we illustrate the “importance” order
of the loads from the defender’s perspective by examining
the decrement ∆0 − ∆ when the initial value is ∆0 and
the defender compensates a fixed qk,maxd = 1 pu, ∀k, on a
single load. Similarly, the greater the decrement, the more
“important” that load is to the defender. While Tables I shows
the “importance” ranking of the loads before the attack, i.e.
when the initial ∆ = ∆0, we found that the “importance”
ranking does not depend on the initial value of ∆.
In general, multiple SEs are possible for any choice of
game settings. In this example, multiple SEs occur in two
regions in the range of costs shown in Fig. 1. First, for γd ≤
0.15, the defender is able to invest into all loads, resulting
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in ∆ = ∆0, but best responses of the attacker vary, creating
multiple SEs. The CBSE occurs when the attacker chooses
not to act to save its cost as shown in the first row of Fig. 2.
Second, in the region γd ≥ 0.75, γa ≤ 0.15, the attacker is
very strong while the defender is severely resources-limited.
Thus, voltage collapse cannot be avoided. While multiple
SEs exist, e.g. the attacker invests fully into all loads and
the defender invests into some “important” loads, the CBSE
corresponds to the cases illustrated in the bottom row of Fig.
2 and top row of Fig. 3. By choosing the CBSE, the defender
saves cost by not acting since it cannot avoid voltage collapse
while the attacker invests into its three “important” loads,
sufficient to achieve voltage collapse.
𝛾ௗ
Attacker’s Strategy 𝒂௢
∗ Defender’s Strategy 𝒅௢
∗
𝑈௔ሺ𝒂௢
∗ , 𝒅௢
∗ ሻ ∆
0 0 0.1935
0.2 0.0467 0.2402
0.4 0.4172 0.6107
1 0.8065 1
𝑎௞=0, 0.5, 1 𝑑௞=0, 0.5, 1
4 5 6 7 8 9 4 5 6 7 8 9
Fig. 2: Player’s strategies at CBSE when γa ≤ 0.15, La =
Ld = 3
𝛾௔
Attacker’s Strategy 𝒂௢
∗ Defender’s Strategy 𝒅௢
∗
𝑈௔ሺ𝒂௢
∗ , 𝒅௢
∗ ሻ ∆
0 0.8065 1
0.3 0.6127 0.8062
0.5 0.4153 0.6088
1 0.1810 0.3745
𝑎௞=0, 0.5, 1 𝑑௞=0, 0.5, 1
4 5 6 7 8 9 4 5 6 7 8 9
Fig. 3: Player’s strategies at CBSE when γd ≥ 0.75, La =
Ld = 3
Next, we examine the effect of cost constraints on the
players’ investment strategies. In Fig. 2 the attacker has
plentiful resources (γa ≤ 0.15). As the cost of defense per
load γd increases, the defender protects fewer loads and/or
reduces the level of protection, thus reducing the utility
Ud(a∗o,d
∗
o) at CBSE, or increasing ∆. When γd = 0.2, the
defender targets its “important” loads (Table I), i.e. 4, 5,
6, and 8 are fully protected (dk = 1) while less “important”
loads 7 and 9 are protected at half-strength (dk = 0.5). When
γd = 0.4, the defender’s budget tightens further, and only
the most “important” four loads are protected although only
the third ranked load is protected fully, revealing limitations
of the load-ranking method in Table I. The latter ranking
is based on attacking or defending a single load and thus
is imprecise for multiple-load attack or protection scenarios
due to nonlinearity of (4).
In Fig. 3, we illustrate the players’ strategies at CBSE
when the defender is resource-limited. For γa ≤ 0.15, the
defender is able to reduce ∆ by protecting the “important”
loads 5, 6 and/or 8 at the level dk = 0.5. These strategies
correspond to the defender’s best effort under limited re-
sources. The attacker also chooses to attack its “important”
loads, but tries to avoid investing into the loads protected by
the defender. These choices are caused by the proposed game
hierarchy and the nonlinear nature of the payoff function.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
a
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
U
a
(a* o
,
d* o
)
Ld=2
Ld=3,4
Ld=5
Fig. 4: Attacker’s utility at CBSE vs. γa when La = 2 and
Ld varies, γd = 0.5
Next, we examine the dependency of the players’ payoffs
on the levels of investment La, Ld. In Fig. 4, we illustrate
the attacker’s utility at CBSE as the defender’s number of
investment levels Ld varies while fixing La = 2. Similar
simulations were performed for other scenarios, where the
number of levels of one player is fixed while the other
player’s number of investment levels varies, and the results
confirm the conclusion in Theorem 1(e). Since the game
complexity scales as LKa ×LKd and becomes very large even
for the 9-bus system (K = 6) as La or Ld grows, more
thorough analysis of this dependency will be addressed in
future work.
Finally, we compared the game described in this Section
with the Individual Optimization (IO) method, where the
players do not take into account the opponent’s actions or
the game hierarchy [14], [15]. Significant losses in cost and
up to 18% loss in payoff were observed for some cost pairs
for each player when using the IO method, thus underscoring
the importance of strategic investment.
B. CBSG for the IEEE 39-bus System
One reason for performing a detailed analysis of our game
on a relatively small power system model, such as the IEEE
9-bus system, was to demonstrate that the attacker’s and
defender’s investment choices are mostly limited to the top
few “important” loads (from Table I and Fig. 2-3). Moreover,
for the IEEE 9 bus system, we compared the game above,
where all loads were used (Fig. 1-4), with the SG where
each player targets only its top four “important” loads in
Table I. We found that when γa > 0.5 and γd > 0.5, the
SEs and, thus, the playoffs of the two games are exactly
the same. Outside this cost range, the difference between
the payoffs of the two games is at most 0.18. This result
can be explained by observing that in the region γa > 0.5
and γd > 0.5, the attacker (or defender) has sufficient
resources for attacking (or protecting) only 4 loads fully
or partially with 3-level investment, and, thus, concentrates
on the top four ‘important” loads even if other loads are
included in its action set. Taking a hint from this observation,
we can apply the proposed game to any larger-scale power
system model over a subset of loads that includes the most
“important” loads. We expect the resulting performance to
approximate closely that of the full-scale game (over all
system loads) except for the cost region where one of the
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players is not resource-constrained. This approach reduces
computational complexity significantly in practical resource-
limited scenarios.
We next validate our game using important loads of the
39-bus model. This model has 29 loads, and the nominal
voltage stability index is computed as ∆0 = 0.5560. We
first determine the most “important” loads of the IEEE 39-
bus system using the approach described in Sec.IV.A (Table
I). We found that the five most “important” loads for the
attacker are 11 > 6 > 5 > 10 > 13 while the five most
“important” loads to the defender are 7 > 8 > 5 > 6 > 11,
where A > B indicates that load A is ranked higher than
load B.
௔
ௗ
inaccurate 
payoffs
Fig. 5: Attacker’s utility at CBSE vs. γa and γd for the IEEE
39-bus system, La = Ld = 2
Based on the above analysis, we construct a CBSG over
the selected subset of loads in the IEEE 39-bus system:
{5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13}, which includes both players’ five most
important loads. Moreover, we assume both players employ
La = Ld = 2 in this pilot study since a higher number
of levels increases complexity significantly. We note that in
the region γa > 0.2 and γd > 0.2, only 5 loads can be
attacked or protected with 2-level investment. Thus, in the
latter region, each player concentrates most of the time on the
top five “important” loads, and the simpler SG where only
the top five “important” loads of each player are employed
in the action sets is expected to closely approximate the
complex game where all 29 loads are targeted. Fig. 5 shows
the attacker’s utility at CBSE for varying scaled costs γa
and γd. We observe the same performance trends as in Fig.
1 and Theorem 1. Note that only the region γa > 0.2 and
γd > 0.2 provides accurate estimation of the full-scale game.
Although the payoffs are inaccurate in the shaded region
of Fig. 5 (γa < 0.2 or γd < 0.2), we are certain that
voltage collapse (∆ = 1) occurs in this region according
to Theorem 1(d), but the exact location of voltage collapse
would require a full-scale game. Note that small values
γa < 0.2 or γd < 0.2 indicate very large resources of one
player, which is unlikely in practice. Finally, we observe
that in the IEEE 39-bus system, the attacker is successful
in raising the instability index ∆ over a larger range of the
cost region than in Fig. 1 since the nominal instability index
of the 39-bus model is 0.5560, which is much higher than
that for the IEEE 9-bus system (0.1935). In other words,
the 39-bus model is more “stressed” than the 9-bus model.
Nevertheless,voltage collapse is expected to occur only when
the attacker has very small cost γa and the defender’s cost
γd is large. We conclude that for both examples, voltage
collapse can be successfully prevented unless the defender’s
security resources are disproportionately limited relative to
the attacker’s budget.
V. CONCLUSION
We proposed a cost-based Security Investment Stackelberg
game for voltage stability of a power system. In the proposed
game, investment resources are allocated strategically to
optimize the players’ performance objectives and to save
costs. It is demonstrated that voltage stability is maintained
unless the defender’s security budget is much lower than the
attacker’s budget. Future work will focus on extending the
proposed game to power system models with uncertainties,
scenarios where a player has limited knowledge of the
opponent’s resources, as well as to numerical approaches
that scale well with the size of the system model.
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I. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Theorem 1(a). A Stackelberg Equilibrium (SE) exists in a finite two-player Stackelberg game (SG) [S1].
Proof. Let Γd denote the set of strategies d for the defender (leader) and Γa the set of strategies a for the attacker
(follower). Since Γd and Γa are finite, the game is finite, that is, the best response function g(d) for any strategy
d maps to a finite non-empty set (i.e. a maximum always exists for optimization (15) in the paper when Γa is
finite). The leader’s equilibrium strategy d∗ exists since a maximum always exists for optimization (17) when Γd is
finite. Similarly, the follower’s equilibrium strategy, given by a∗ = g(d∗), also exists. Thus, a strategy pair (a∗,d∗)
satisfying (15), (17) exists for a finite two-player Stackelberg game.
Theorem 1(b). All SEs of a zero-sum SG have the same payoffs.
Proof. Since the game is zero-sum, Ua(a,d) = −Ud(a,d). The optimization problems (15) and (17) can be
combined as a mini-max problem:
d∗ = arg max
d
Ud(g(d),d) (S1)
= − arg max
d
Ua(g(d),d)
= arg min
d
Ua(g(d),d)
= arg min
d
max
a
Ua(a,d).
Denote the optimum of min
d
max
a
Ua(a,d) as Uao . Assume two different equilibrium strategy pairs (SEs) (a∗i ,d
∗
i )
and (a∗j ,d
∗
j ), i 6= j, are solutions of (S1). Both such strategy pairs must result in the same optimal payoffs, i.e.
Ua(a∗i ,d
∗
i ) = U
a(a∗j ,d
∗
j ) = U
a
o , where U
a
o is the solution to (S1). A similar argument can be made for the case
when the game has N SEs, where N > 2.
Theorem 1(c). In a CBSG, given La and Ld, the utility of each player is non-increasing with its cost per load
when the opponent’s cost per load is fixed.
Proof. Assume La and Ld are fixed. When the attacker’ cost per load is γa and the defender’s cost per load is γd,
the defender’s utility at an SE is Ud. Let Γa and Γd denote the sets of strategies a and d, respectively. Similarly,
When the attacker’ cost per load is γa, and the defender’s cost per load increases to γ′d, where γ
′
d > γd, the
1
defender’s utility at an SE is Ud
′
. In this case, the attacker’s action space remains Γa while the defender’s action
space for γ′d is denoted Γ
d′ . From (10), it is easy to show that Γd
′ ⊂ Γd since γ′d > γd.
Since the game is zero-sum, Ua(a,d) = −Ud(a,d). Eq (15) can be rewritten as:
g(d) = arg max
a
Ua(a,d) (S2)
= arg max
a
−Ud(a,d)
= arg min
a
Ud(a,d).
Combining (S2) with (17), the optimization of the defender becomes:
d∗ = arg max
d
Ud(g(d),d) (S3)
= arg max
d
min
a
Ud(a,d).
From (S3), given γa, the defender’s utility at an SE for γd is computed as Ud = max
d∈Γd
min
a∈Γa
Ud(a,d) while its
utility at an SE for γ′d is U
d′ = max
d′∈Γd′
min
a∈Γa
Ud(a,d). Since Γd
′ ⊂ Γd, Ud′ ≤ Ud. Thus, the defender’s utility is
non-increasing with its cost per load γd when γa is fixed.
A similar argument shows that when the defender’s cost per load γd is fixed and the attacker’s cost per load γa
increases, the attacker’s utility at an SE is non-increasing.
Theorem 1(d). Given La and Ld, there exist  > 0 and θ > 0 such that when γa <  while γd > θ, the attacker’s
utility at CBSE Ua(a∗o,d
∗
o) = 1 − ∆0 (i.e. voltage collapse occurs). Moreover, there exists an α > 0 such that
when γd < α, the attacker’s utility at CBSE Ua(a∗o,d
∗
o) = 0 (i.e. ∆ = ∆
0).
Proof. From (11) and (12) in the paper, the range of the voltage instability index values in this game is [∆0, 1] in
the game. Thus, the range of the attacker’s utility at an SE is Ua(a∗o,d
∗
o) ∈ [0, 1−∆0]. First, assume that  < 1/K,
where K is the total number of loads, and θ > (Ld − 1). Then from (8) and (10), when γa <  and γd > θ, the
defender cannot protect any loads while the attacker is able to attack all loads fully. According to the assumption
(i) at the end of Section III.B, the attacker is able to cause voltage collapse when this scenario occurs. While we
assumed above that  and θ are sufficiently small and large, respectively, to disable the defender and fully enable
the attacker, voltage collapse, i.e. Ua(a∗o,d
∗
o) = 1−∆0, can occur in other, less restrictive, scenarios as illustrated
in Fig. 1.
Similarly, assume that α < 1/K and γd < α. In this case, the defender can protect each load fully according to
(10). Using the assumption (ii) stated at the end of Section III.B, the defender can compensate for any attack in
this case, thus maintaining the nominal instability index ∆0, resulting in the attacker’s utility Ua(a∗o,d
∗
o) = 0 at an
SE.
Theorem 1(e). When Ld (or La) is increased to a number of investment levels L
′
d (or L
′
a) that satisfies L
′
d − 1 =
n(Ld − 1) (or L′a − 1 = n(La − 1)), where n is a positive integer, the defender’s (or attacker’s) utility does not
decrease if the costs and the opponent’s number of investment levels La (or Ld) are fixed.
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Proof. Assume γa and γd are fixed. Let Ud denote the defender’s utility at an SE when the attacker’s number of
investment levels is La and the defender’s number of investment levels is Ld. Similarly, when the attacker’s number
of investment levels is La and the defender’s number of investment levels is L
′
d, let U
d′ denote the defender’s
utility at an SE.
When the defender’s number of investment levels is Ld, the defender’s actions are represented by d = [d1, · · · , dk,
· · · , dK ], where dk ∈ D = {0, 1/(Ld − 1), 2/(Ld − 1), · · · , 1} denotes the defender’s investment level on load k.
Let Γd denote the set of strategies d for the defender for this case.
When the defender’s number of investment levels is increased to L
′
d − 1 = n(Ld − 1), where n is a positive
integer, the set of possible values of dk ∈ D′ = {0, 1/(L′d − 1), 2/(L
′
d − 1), · · · , 1}. Let Γd
′
denote the set of
strategies d′ for the defender for this case. Since L
′
d − 1 = n(Ld − 1), it is easy to show that D ⊂ D
′
. Thus,
Γd ⊂ Γd′ .
When computing the SEs, the defender searches all possible actions in its action space Γd (for Ld) or Γd
′
(for
L
′
d). Since Γ
d ⊂ Γd′ , Ud ≤ Ud′ . Thus, the defender’s utility does not decrease when its number of investment
levels is increased to L
′
d − 1 = n(Ld − 1), where n is a positive integer given the costs and La are fixed.
Similar arguments can be made for the case when the defender’s number of investment levels Ld is fixed and
the attacker’s number of investment levels La is increased to a larger number L
′
a − 1 = n(La − 1).
II. COMPARISON OF THE CBSG AND INDIVIDUAL OPTIMIZATION (IO)
A. Individual Optimization
Instead of playing the proposed SG, the attacker and the defender can choose to optimize their investment profiles
individually. Moreover, when the players do not have information about their opponent, they can still optimize their
utilities under given constraints. By assuming the opponent is inactive, denote the reactive power demand for the
ith outcome of the attacker’s investment a as Qa,i
′
L = Q
0
L + q
i
a, where q
i
a is defined in (6), and the defender is
assumed inactive. The resulting attacker’s utility for the ith outcome is expressed as:
Ua,iind(a) =
∥∥∥Q−1cirtQa,i′L ∥∥∥∞ −∆0, (S4)
and, the expected utility of the attacker assuming the defender is inactive is given by:
Uaind(a) = E(U
a,i
ind(a)) =
2K∑
i
Pa
(
Oi
)
Ua,iind(a), (S5)
where Pa
(
Oi
)
is given by (5).
The attacker’s individual optimization problem is to find the investment profile a∗ind that satisfies:
a∗ind = arg max
a
Uaind(a) (S6)
s.t. γa||a||1 ≤ 1, qka ≤ qk,maxa ,∀k.
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Similarly, assuming the attacker is inactive, for the defender’s investment d, the resulting reactive power demand
is denoted as Qd
′
L = Q
0
L − qd, where qd is defined in (7). The resulting defender’s utility is given by:
Udind(d) = ∆
0 −
∥∥∥Q−1cirtQd′L ∥∥∥∞. (S7)
The defender’s individual optimization problem is to determine the individual profile d∗ind that satisfies:
d∗ind = arg max
d
Udind(d) (S8)
s.t. γd||d||1 ≤ 1.
Given a∗ind and d
∗
ind in (S6) and (S8), the actual reactive power demand of the i
th outcome is Qi
′
L,ind =
Q0L + q
i
a∗ind
− qd∗ind , producing the instability index increment (i.e. the attacker’s utility) of the individual opti-
mization method as:
UaIO(a
∗
ind,d
∗
ind) = Clip
 2K∑
i
Pa∗ind
(
Oi
) ∥∥∥Q−1cirtQi′L,ind∥∥∥∞; (∆0, 1)
−∆0. (S9)
Similarly, we define the defender’s utility of the IO method as the ∆ decrement:
UdIO(a
∗
ind,d
∗
ind) = −UaIO(a∗ind,d∗ind). (S10)
B. Numerical Results
As discussed above, in the IO method, each player chooses its optimal strategy assuming no action is taken
by the opponent. On the other hand, in the SG game, each player’s strategy is that player’s optimal response
to the opponent’s action. Thus, the IO method is a suboptimal approach when the opponent is active, but it has
lower complexity and does not require estimation of the opponent’s capabilities. In the following, we compare the
performance of the proposed CBSG game and IO.
From Fig. S1, we observe that each player’s payoff can be up to 18% lower when using IO relative to playing the
game for some cost pairs (γa, γd). For example, when γa = 0.85 and γd = 0.65, the defender’s payoff is around
18% lower when employing the IO method than playing the game. When γa = 0.3 and γd = 0.3, the attacker
loses around 16% of its payoff with IO method. Moreover, Fig. S2 compares the optimal strategies of CBSG and
IO. We observe that each player targets its “important” loads in IO while in the game the attacker often prefers
to avoid the loads targeted by the defender (e.g. when γa = 0.5 and γd = 0.5). Also, note that the players’ costs
can be significantly lower when playing the proposed CBSE than in IO since CBBI selects an SE with the lowest
cost while in IO, each player invests fully up to the given budget constraints. For example, when γa = 0.1 and
γd = 0.1, the attacker prefers not to act in CBSG to save cost since the defender can compensate for any action
of the attacker in this case. On the other hand, in the IO method, the attacker attacks all loads, thus incurring
much higher cost to obtain the same payoff as in SG in this scenario. Finally, the players’ utilities (S4) and (S7)
are not limited to [∆0, 1] since each player is not aware of the opponent’s action and simply tries to modify the
instability index. Thus we observe unique solutions to (S6) and (S8), resulting in a single optimal pair (a∗ind,d
∗
ind).
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In contrast, multiple SEs are possible in a SG, and the resulting CBSE has a lower cost than the corresponding IO
investment strategy as Shown in Fig. S2.
By definition, an SE provides the optimal payoffs for both players. By comparing the game with IO, we evaluated
the possibility of not employing the game. However, our analysis shows that each player experiences significant
losses with the IO method. In particular, a player can have lower payoff and higher cost for some cost pairs in IO
than in CBSG, which provides incentives for playing the game.
Fig. S1: Fractional difference of attacker’s utility Ua(a∗o,d
∗
o) of SG at CBSE and utility of IO U
a
IO(a
∗
ind,d
∗
ind) (in
% relative to Ua(a∗o,d
∗
o)) for the IEEE 9-bus system, La = Ld = 3
Fig. S2: Comparison of optimal strategies at CBSE and IO for the IEEE 9-bus system, La = Ld = 3
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